



La Procesión de la Bandera Tacna, 28 de julio 1901

Signed by José María Barreto and addressed to
President Eduardo López de Romaña of Peru

LINES in the SAND

*Nationalism and Identity on
the Peruvian-Chilean Frontier*



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I dedicate this book, in loving memory,

to my father and mother,

Paul and Amelia Skuban



much, Rosemary. All translations from Spanish, except where otherwise noted, are my own, as are any remaining errors.

Two individuals stand out for their significant support on this project, one from Davis who became involved early on in the process, and one from Fresno whose valuable contributions came a bit later. From Davis, Claudio Robles Ortiz helped me in countless ways as this project passed through its many phases. He opened the doors of his home in Santiago to me, helped me decipher his country's splendid *chilenismos*, and shared his loving family; I could not hope for a dearer friend. Honora Howell Chapman, Fresno State's classicist par excellence, gave unstintingly of her time and read the entire manuscript to help smooth over its rough spots in detail, organization, and logic. Without question, her comments and suggestions improved this book in many ways, and her boundless optimism kept me encouraged during the final stages of this process. To you, Nora, I offer my heartfelt thanks.

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INTRODUCTION

Nationalism and Identity



*A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor,
a daily plebiscite.*

—Ernest Renan, from “What is a Nation?”
Lecture at the Sorbonne, 1882

The epigraph above serves as a fitting entry point to the study that follows. Seldom in the modern history of Latin America has a single event provided a richer opportunity to examine the issues of nationalism, national identity, and the relationship between citizen and nation than the dispute over Tacna and Arica, two territorial provinces that now straddle the Peruvian-Chilean border. Following the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), which pitted Chile against the allies Peru and Bolivia, the Treaty of Ancón awarded Chile the right to administer the occupied Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica for a period of ten years, after which the inhabitants of the provinces via a plebiscite would then choose the nation of their formal citizenship. The governments of Peru and Chile, however, failed to conduct the vote that would determine the fate of Tacna and Arica, even though in the 1920s the United States became actively involved in arbitrating the dispute. In 1929, Peru and Chile finally agreed simply to divide the territory, with Chile retaining Arica and Peru reincorporating Tacna.

The primary aim of this book is to help explain the processes of nationalism and national identity formation by viewing them through the unique analytical lens provided by the controversy over the Tacna-Arica plebiscite. During this controversy, referred to by contemporaries as the “Question of the Pacific,” Peruvian and Chilean statesmen

attempted to inculcate their respective national identities in the people living in Tacna and Arica in order to win the plebiscite. Most scholars now agree on the invented, or constructed, nature of nations and national identities. In other words, rather than seeing the nation as a primordial entity and national identity as something ineluctably inherited from the past, theorists now view them as the discursive constructions of leaders and intellectuals intent on advancing specific political projects. As Ernest Gellner noted, “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.”¹ Throughout this book I will underscore this constructed nature of the nation by highlighting various contours of these discursive battles over Tacna and Arica, where the leaders of two central states clashed in the process of advancing their respective national projects in the region.

The events that surrounded the Tacna-Arica plebiscite bring into sharp relief the methods employed by political and intellectual leaders to invent their nations. Significantly, Peruvian and Chilean statesmen crafted widely divergent variations, with the former emphasizing the cultural and historical attributes of a nation, and the latter stressing its political and civic elements.² To reinforce in the minds of *tacneños* and *ariqueños* their sense of belonging to Peru—and to secure their votes—Peruvian leaders attempted to control those agencies and institutions most vital for widespread propaganda and political education, namely, the schools, the press, and the churches. In order to ensure victory in the plebiscite, the Peruvian state attempted discursively to reinforce a historically and culturally based Peruvian national identity in Tacna and Arica as its best defense against losing more national territory to Chile.³

On the other hand, Chilean leaders had ideological labor to perform as well. Chilean statesmen faced the difficult task of reinventing Tacna and Arica as Chilean provinces after they had long pertained to the social formation known as Peru. To accomplish this objective, they likewise identified the schools, the press, and the churches as sources of nationalist propaganda, thus setting the stage for confrontation with Peru. But Chilean statesmen advanced a highly voluntaristic interpretation of nationalism and the nation, asserting that individuals could

rationally chose their nationality. “Where your well-being is, there is your fatherland” became the essential message of Chile’s propaganda, and that same slogan appeared in newspapers and on posters throughout the region. Chilean political and intellectual elites tried to define the nation as a civic association in which individuals enjoyed basic rights, including the right to pursue their economic well-being. Those same leaders never tired of boasting that through their administration Tacna and Arica had experienced greater prosperity and material improvement than they ever had under Peru. These divergent discourses of nationalism, converging on a group of people in a sensitive frontier region, underscore the constructed and arbitrary nature of the nation and make the case of Tacna and Arica a highly important one for the study of nationalism and national identity in Latin America.

The focus of this book, though, shifts away from the two centralizing nation-states and onto local society in Tacna and Arica. Indeed, an important aspect of nationalism and national identity formation that has received much scholarly attention is the idea that diverse groups within any single society can “imagine” the same putative nation, but in different ways. Take, for example, the provincial elite in Tacna and Arica. During the War of the Pacific, these regional elite identified themselves as loyal Peruvians, even though historically they did not always accept the exclusive—and highly centralized—way *limeño* elites envisioned the Peruvian nation.⁴ During the Chilean occupation of Tacna, the same provincial elite viscerally rejected the attempts by political leaders in Santiago to “chileanize” the provinces, and as part of their rejection of the Chilean nationalist agenda, they increasingly emphasized a unique collective identity, this one anchored in the regional history of the provinces themselves. But, while the Peruvian provincial elite initially claimed that all *tacneños* were firmly united in their loyalty to Peru, with the passage of time even some Peruvians in Tacna and Arica began to view their interests as perhaps better served under a Chilean administration.

Scholars have noted this type of situational behavior on other contested frontiers. In his recent study of national identity formation

on the US-Mexican frontier in the period 1800–1850, historian Andrés Reséndez argues that identity choices often follow a “situational logic,” and that different groups and individuals make “opportunistic or optimizing choices” when faced with loyalty decisions on a contested frontier.⁵ In Tacna and Arica, the choices and decisions of some provincial leaders often caused rifts within the Peruvian community, and I will address these topics, identity choice and loyalty decisions, as they affected local society on the Peruvian-Chilean frontier as well.

In Tacna and Arica, however, there existed not one monolithic local society, but a fissured social tableau in which people simultaneously belonged to many groups and possessed diverse collective identities, of which nationality represented but one. Local society in the provinces of Tacna and Arica fractured along lines of race, class, gender, generation, and community, to name a few, and people subsumed under these categorical identities assumed their own particular notions of citizenship. To take one example, in the highland regions of Tacna, the Chilean occupation severely tested communities of Aymara Indians who at the same time experienced an ambivalent relationship with the Peruvian state. Neglected and scorned for the most part by the creole elite in Lima who questioned the ability of Indians to comprehend the very concept of nation, Aymara leaders in the southern highlands nevertheless considered themselves and their people loyal Peruvians, a conviction reinforced by the Chilean invasion of their homeland when they fought against the intruders much like the inhabitants of the central sierra did under the leadership of General Andrés Cáceres.⁶

At times during the Chilean occupation, however, Aymara leaders invoked a collective identity that seemingly cut across both the Peruvian and Chilean national identities then under construction. Frequently, the primary unit of allegiance for the indigenous peasantry in Tacna became simply the community, or even the family. If nationalism signifies giving absolute priority to the values and interests of one’s nation over all other interests, then at certain junctures during the occupation it appeared to the Peruvian political elite in Lima and Tacna that some Aymara leaders did not act in a purely national way. I will argue that Indians in the

southern sierra did, in fact, act in a national way, deploying the discourse of nationalism to advance a particular national identity that not only made room for their more recently formed sensibilities as Peruvians, but also accommodated their more time-honored collective identities as members of individual Aymara communities. Here, again, the logic of the situation influenced identity choices and decisions made on a highly sensitive frontier, and here, once again, is a reminder that “memories and identities are not fixed things, but representations or constructions of reality, subjective rather than objective phenomena.”⁷

An additional aim of this book is to contribute to the literature on Latin American frontier and border dynamics. Andrés Reséndez, quoted earlier, hoped that his own book would “further debate about frontier dynamics and their impact on identities around the world,” and would also answer the call that Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson had made earlier for more scholarly attention to the study of frontiers, especially through the lens of comparative analysis.⁸ Lamar and Thompson regarded a frontier as “not a boundary or line, but as a territory or zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct societies.” They go on to posit that a “frontier ‘opens’ . . . when the first representatives of the intrusive society arrive; it ‘closes’ when a single political authority has established hegemony over the zone.” Finally, for these authors, there exist three “essential elements in any frontier situation . . . : territory; two or more initially distinct people; and the process by which the relations among peoples in the territory begin, develop, and eventually crystallize.”⁹

The Peruvian-Chilean frontier opened when Chilean forces emerged victorious in battle and occupied the provinces of Tacna and Arica in 1880; it putatively closed in 1929 when the governments of Peru and Chile formally agreed by treaty to divide the provinces. The nearly fifty years in between, the period encompassed by this book, reveal how relations evolved between people of two distinct national identities as they became part of the centralizing processes of two nation-states. In this way, the study of Tacna and Arica has much to offer the study of frontier and border dynamics.

The arguments within this book also contribute to Peruvian and Chilean historiography by viewing the Tacna-Arica controversy through the twin prisms of nationalism and identity formation. This is a perspective that, I believe, holds the greatest promise for a much richer social history that captures the complexity of what took place on that volatile frontier. Much of the early, contemporary literature on the Question of the Pacific was polemical in nature, as nationalist passions held sway and most political and intellectual leaders from both countries zealously defended their nation's claim to the disputed territory.¹⁰ These early works almost invariably viewed the problem as one of international conflict and diplomacy, a question of nation building, but one almost entirely interpreted from the level of the state. Likewise, several treatments of the Tacna-Arica controversy by social scientists in the United States, spurred on by their country's involvement in the dispute, appeared through the years, but the problem again was examined as a case study in state-centered, international conflict resolution.¹¹

Perhaps taking a cue from developments in the 1970s, when lingering animosities between Peru and Chile over the controversy resurfaced, Peruvian historian Raúl Palacios Rodríguez in 1974 wrote *La chilениzación de Tacna and Arica, 1883–1929*, a triumphalist account in which he surveyed the impact of Chilean policy on the disputed provinces.¹² Palacios Rodríguez's book, while it did tend to move the analysis away from the central states and onto the people in Tacna and Arica, still did not problematize local society; the people of Tacna and Arica in his account remained essentially a solid, undifferentiated block of loyal Peruvians among which the vexing questions of identity and loyalty seldom emerged. It is my hope that this book will capture the complexity of how local society from below responds to nationalist initiatives from the central states above and, in the words of Peter Sahlin, explain nationalism from the "double perspective of the states and of local society."¹³

To capture this two-way nature of nationalism, I adopted what seemed a commonsensical research strategy: First, I worked in archives in the two capital cities, and then I took my investigations to the frontier. Few works on the Tacna-Arica controversy have vigorously

combined research in the numerous archives in both Lima and Santiago, and none, of which I am aware, have bothered with an investigation of the documentary sources available on the disputed frontier itself. The Regional Archive of Tacna (ART) has been overlooked in virtually all studies—except those by local scholars—of the Tacna-Arica dispute, yet critical sources (local government documents, more extensive collections of local newspapers of the times) abound there and help gauge the response of local society during the crisis. Indeed, this book benefits from official documents in Lima, Santiago, and Tacna that never, to the best of my knowledge, have been brought to bear upon any analysis of the Tacna-Arica controversy.¹⁴

I will admit from the outset of this study that I approach the Peruvian-Chilean frontier from the north, as a North American scholar investigating what became, without doubt, the episode that more than any other damaged international relations between Peru and Chile in the wake of the War of the Pacific. I believe this outsider's view helps me to avoid the polemical tone that has characterized so many studies of the Tacna-Arica controversy through the years. This northerly approach will also be detected in the chapters that deal with local society, in which I concentrate primarily—though by no means entirely—on the effect that the national struggles between the central states of Peru and Chile had on the existing Peruvian population in the region. Peruvians in Tacna and Arica experienced these national struggles in ways that Chileans who migrated into the provinces from the south did not. There was seldom any question of a Chilean in the disputed provinces making an identity choice to become a Peruvian citizen, although that trajectory was possible. Chileans who relocated to Tacna and Arica had less historical presence in the land and were dependent on the Chilean state for their survival in hostile Peruvian territory. Peruvians, on the other hand, faced over time the more difficult identity choices on the disputed frontier and their responses offer telling examples of how local society responds to the sometimes uncompromising imperatives of official state nationalism. Some tacneños and ariqueños, in fact, would come to see life as Chilean citizens much more advantageous than their continued

existence as Peruvians and these people—*chileneros* as they would be called—were scorned by those who remained loyal to Peru.

The War of the Pacific and the resulting Tacna-Arica controversy represent decisive events in the national histories of three South American countries. This book does not aim to reassess the war and its aftermath, or to pass judgment on the actions of leaders and people in either Peru or Chile. The dispute over Tacna and Arica has been—and continues to be—for some in both countries an emotionally and, at times, painfully charged topic. Indeed, the events of the period still loom large for people on both sides of the frontier, and the controversy continues to constitute an integral part of their collective memory and identity. In part, this is why nationalism possesses such raw power—it helps to determine who and what we are. Issues of nationalism and identity are deeply embedded in the Tacna-Arica controversy; their excavation is the goal of this work.

Plotting the Theoretical Terrain

Nationalism may be best understood as a multidimensional project simultaneously aimed at enunciating a group's unique collective identity, based on a wide universe of cultural criteria, and at securing certain political objectives for that group.¹⁵ A national project, however, remains open-ended, and its specific cultural and political content becomes an object of contention over time among a multitude of groups falling within the putative scope of its influence; nationalism, therefore, is both historical and processual. Dominant groups will emerge, attended by their highly particularistic projects for organizing society, and they will invariably attempt to impose these on all people within their state's territorial grasp. Subordinate groups, possessing among themselves a much broader range of interests, often oppose these efforts with their own programs. At times the competing objectives of these subaltern classes might be partially incorporated by the dominant groups; at other times, these alternative visions are buried, often by the dominant group's growing monopoly on force and violence.¹⁶ But the process goes on, in subtle and innumerable ways, and it is never simply a one-way, top-down process.

The theoretical framework supporting this understanding of nationalism owes much to the work of Benedict Anderson, Antonio Gramsci, and Jürgen Habermas. With his evocative concept “imagined communities” Anderson focused attention both on the constructed, or imagined, quality of the modern nation and on the immense affective power of nationalism. Locating the origins of nationalism partly in the expanding print media of late-colonial Spanish America, Anderson argues that the new nation-states that emerged out of the old Spanish empire were culturally created from above by creole elites who sought to construct national identities powerful enough to overcome all other collective identities and loyalties.¹⁷ Anderson's critics have noted that his explanation of nations and nationalism, original and illuminating as it is, does not account for what the concept “nation” meant to people of “diverse social, regional, racial, and cultural descriptions,” as well as whether—and how—people contested these divergent meanings.¹⁸ Nevertheless, as Claudio Lomnitz wrote in 2001, “Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* probably has been the single most influential work on nationalism of the past two decades.”¹⁹

Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony has proved equally influential in recent studies of nationalism. Gramsci explained how elite groups use their control over state power and their perceived prestige to produce an intricate combination of consent and coercion to subjugate subaltern groups. But Gramsci went on to theorize that subaltern social groups possess alternative identities, defined by pre-existing mentalities, ideologies, and aims, and at times these groups will press demands on the state based upon those visions or interests. In this way, it is possible for them to become contenders in the process of nation making, as well as in the construction of their own national identity. It is this aspect of Gramsci's analysis—contention—that most informs this book.²⁰

Jürgen Habermas also theorized that civil society could press its demands on the state, though primarily through the official institutions of liberal democracy. Habermas identified the existence of what he termed the public sphere, an intermediate realm of discourse independent of state control wherein private individuals possessed the capacity

for influencing public opinion as well as for social organization.²¹ In its mediating role between society and state, the public sphere exerts an influence on the government and becomes the primary vehicle through which civil society may alter the collective vision for organizing the nation. As idealized and explained by Habermas, access to the public sphere was guaranteed to all citizens.²² In practice, though, Habermas's ideal public sphere always proved to be exclusionary; not every sector of society could participate in the generation of a local, or bottom-up, challenge to state power. Nonetheless, his ideas on the expansion of public opinion and consciousness through a growing infrastructure of social communication help shed light on the discursive construction of collective identities and the development of an audience for the nationalist discourse of its political and intellectual leaders.²³

Following from the thought of Anderson, Gramsci, and Habermas, this book, in a methodological sense, considers the nation building process from above and below, and answers the call of many scholars who have identified the need for studies that seriously integrate theory and grounded empirical reality.²⁴ Equally important, this book responds to those who understand the value of regional studies that attend to both structure and agency, to both politics and culture.²⁵ By analyzing how leaders of both the Peruvian and Chilean states imposed their national projects on the people living in Tacna and Arica, this book highlights the process of nation-state formation at a critical juncture in the political histories of two South American countries. By examining how local society in Tacna and Arica responded to those official initiatives, I emphasize how diverse groups of people possessed the cultural and political capacity to help fashion their own national identities, thus situating this case study within the larger social scientific literature that deals with identity formation. With this book, too, I seek to contribute to the continuing development of a Latin American political history that views nation-state formation as a complex, two-way process in which citizens continually play an important role in negotiating the nation's ultimate form. I believe that Ernest Renan's metaphor at the beginning of this introduction, that "a nation's existence is . . . a daily plebiscite," captures the spirit of this

understanding of political history. In a very real sense, this historical condition nearly rang true for the people in Tacna and Arica.²⁶

Organization

This book features a somewhat eclectic organization that nevertheless seems well suited to the nature of my argument. Chapter 1 follows a chronological path, explaining the origins of the Tacna-Arica controversy and then tracing the historical narrative through to the attempted plebiscite of 1925–1926. By following the tortured course of negotiations over the terms of the plebiscite, I show that through the passage of time Tacna and Arica emerged as important national symbols for both states. For Peruvians, the reincorporation of the two provinces through the plebiscite became a critical step in national regeneration; for Chile, retaining Tacna and Arica served not only strategic and political interests, but national pride as well. As national passions intensified, diplomatic relations and negotiations over the plebiscite suffered, coming at times to a standstill. Finally, in 1922 political leaders from both countries agreed to submit the dispute to third-party arbitration by the United States, and at long last the realization of the plebiscite appeared to be on the horizon.

In chapters 2 and 3 the story is partially rewound, allowing for a closer review of the various methods of "official nationalism" employed by Peruvian and Chilean political leaders to impose their respective national identities in the provinces. Chapter 2 explains how the two governments disseminated their nationalist discourse through various institutional conduits, such as schools, newspapers, and churches. I also show how the Peruvian and Chilean states became increasingly concerned about national symbols in Tacna and Arica, such as the display of flags, patriotic ceremonies, commemorations of historic events, and even insignias and colors worn on one's clothing. I explain how surveillance itself constituted a "technology of power" harnessed by states attempting to impose national identity. The chapter ends by discussing the use of coercion and intimidation in Tacna and Arica, one of the most notorious issues throughout the controversy.

Chapter 3 focuses more sharply on the turbulent period of the US-arbitrated plebiscite of 1925–1926. The United States government had been involved in the Tacna-Arica dispute from the early 1880s when it attempted to broker a peace between Peru and Chile without the transfer of any territory. The direct involvement of the United States in the controversy during the 1920s had much to do with the international prestige the nation, via Woodrow Wilson, had gained as a peacemaker in the aftermath of World War I and through the campaign to launch the League of Nations. Interestingly, President Calvin Coolidge, in his role as arbitrator, named General John J. Pershing president of the Plebiscitary Commission charged with administering the plebiscite. Between August of 1925 and June of 1926, the commission endeavored to carry out what many would later call “the impossible plebiscite.”

The plebiscite became impossible, or “impracticable” as Pershing’s successor General William Lassiter wrote, because during this brief period nationalist passions and violence in Tacna and Arica reached even higher levels of intensity. So, too, did the efforts on the part of Peruvian and Chilean statesmen and intellectuals to fine-tune their national discourses. For example, the ideological tactic of portraying the “other” nation as racially inferior found myriad forms of expression as new print media proliferated in the region. Chilean leaders also honed their use of the census as a tool of surveillance during the attempted plebiscite. Significantly, in addition to representing an instrument of social control, the census also reflected an attempt to create a racially based national identity throughout Chile.

The book’s focus shifts with chapter 4 and begins to examine how local society in Tacna and Arica received and reworked the “official” nationalist programs from the two political centers. Here, Habermas’s concept of the public sphere provides a useful frame of reference. The Peruvian provincial elite of this regional public sphere formed a bulwark against attempts to “chileanize” the provinces by manipulating public opinion and culturally reinforcing a Peruvian national identity in Tacna and Arica. The cultural infrastructure that supported this process included not only the press and other forms of print culture, but

a wide array of voluntary associations and formal institutions, such as literary societies, social clubs, mutual aid societies, and patriotic committees.²⁷ But even though many in the Chilean-administrated provinces found refuge in their Peruvian national identity, *la patria* itself remained technically absent or, in the descriptive term of Jorge Basadre, Peru’s foremost historian of the twentieth century, invisible.²⁸ Peruvian provincial elites would be faced with difficult choices, particularly when the Chilean state began to pursue a more vigorous policy of chileanization. Indeed, at times their attitudes and actions caused rifts within Peruvian local society, and I will address this controversial aspect of local society’s response to the pressures of state-directed national projects as well.

Chileans in Tacna and Arica, to be sure, would follow a similar strategy in the provinces and establish many of the voluntary associations that so characterized civil society at this time. This Chilean public sphere, however, took much longer to reach a critical mass because of the sheer lack of Chileans in the region throughout the early years of the controversy. Beginning with the onset of a more formalized policy of chileanization in the early twentieth century, and as more Chileans arrived in—and more Peruvians left—the provinces, Chilean civil society and associational life matured, especially in Arica.

The increasing participation of women in civil society, via the world of letters and voluntary associations, represented another remarkable aspect of this effervescence of public life in the period of the Tacna-Arica controversy. Beginning in the 1870s, with the revival of the *velada literaria* (literary circle), upper-class Peruvian women on the national level began to enter more squarely into the public sphere by founding several publications devoted not only to feminine issues, but to opinions on politics, philosophy, and religion.²⁹ The work of select women writers from Tacna, such as Carolina Freyre de Jaimes and Zoila Sabel Cáceres, reflected this trend; moreover, both Peruvian and Chilean women in the disputed provinces identified with and participated in the national projects of their countries by organizing and administering voluntary associations, such as patriotic societies for women.

Yet, as Anne McClintock has pointed out, “all nationalisms are gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous,” and both Peruvian and Chilean nationalism at this time remained highly gendered, allowing women to participate in national life only in a limited way.³⁰ One fact particularly underscores the limitations placed on women during the Tacna-Arica controversy: they remained disenfranchised in both Peru and Chile, and women in Tacna and Arica would not have the right to vote in any potential plebiscite. Indeed, as Sarah C. Chambers has observed, in the nineteenth century only women—and slaves—were entirely excluded from those who qualified as “proper” citizens.³¹ Chambers maintains that “taking gender into consideration can yield new insights into the formation of national identities,” and chapter 4 presents the appropriate and necessary venue to explore in depth the gendered dimensions of nationalism during the Tacna-Arica controversy.³²

Chapter 5 probes more deeply into local society by considering how the members of the middle and working classes—the popular sector—in Tacna and Arica participated in the national processes unfolding in the provinces. A continuum existed within this sector, connecting people of diverse occupations, and this phenomenon could clearly be seen in the activity of the largest voluntary association in the provinces, La Sociedad de Artesanos de Auxilios Mutuos “El Porvenir.”³³ This Peruvian organization was established in 1873 by “persons of high profile” in Tacna, but its rank and file consisted of artisans, small shopkeepers, independent smallholders, and people in occupations normally associated with the middle to lower socioeconomic strata of society. During the Chilean occupation of Tacna and Arica, La Sociedad de Artesanos became a stronghold of Peruvian nationalist sentiment, embracing *el bajo pueblo*, or the common people of society, in an attempt to shore up the Peruvian national identity of the province.

Peruvian manual laborers, *obreros*, in Tacna and Arica came under increasing pressure from Chilean workers migrating to the region. In Arica, the arrival of Chilean workers had a clear and devastating effect; hundreds of Peruvian workers found themselves without jobs, forced to leave the region to find work, often in the nitrate fields of Tarapacá

to the south or in other parts of Peru. Just as Peruvian laborers were embraced by the provincial elite for the great national cause, so too were the recently arrived Chilean workers recruited by middle-class elements of Chilean society in Tacna and Arica to form the rank and file of various *ligas patrióticas* (patriotic leagues) to fight for a Chilean victory in the anticipated plebiscite. The tension that evolved between Chilean workers, from a region (northern Chile) that had experienced a vibrant labor movement, and Peruvian workers in Tacna and Arica yields much insight into understanding the interaction between collective identities based upon nation and class.

In chapter 6 I use a particular episode, a water rights dispute between two Aymara communities, to examine how indigenous peasants in the highlands understood the dynamic of nationalism and how it affected their relationship to the Peruvian and Chilean states. This episode of nationalism on the Peruvian-Chilean frontier illuminates the interaction of fluid identities based upon nation, ethnicity, and community for a sector of people in Peru who entered the twentieth century racially stigmatized and excluded in many ways from the promises of liberal nation building.³⁴

The conclusion of the book is followed by a short epilogue that situates the Tacna-Arica controversy within the present-day context of Peruvian-Chilean international relations. Bringing the controversy up-to-date in this way is a fitting end to the volume, for in the national imaginations of some, the lines in the sand of the Peruvian-Chilean frontier have never ceased shifting.

NOTES

Notes to Introduction

1. Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 168. Without exhausting the list of works that emphasize the constructed nature of nations and national identity, see Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991); Partha Chaterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). A particularly useful edited volume on the topic is Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). The latest anthology on nationalism is Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, eds., *Nations and Nationalism: A Reader* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005).
2. These two different notions of national identity, the Peruvian based upon historicist claims of common culture and descent, and the Chilean based upon voluntary citizenship, have been characterized, respectively, by scholars of European nationalism as the German, or ethnic model, and the French, or civic model. See Hans Kohn, *Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789–1815* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967), and Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 8–15.
3. Tacna and Arica had formed a part of the Peruvian nation since independence was declared in 1821, and, prior to that, they had belonged to the viceroyalty of Peru for nearly three hundred years.
4. Jorge Basadre analyzes the phenomenon of centralization in *Perú: Problema y posibilidad*, 4th ed. (Lima: Editores Cultural Cuzco S.A., 1994), 195–211. The first edition of the work was published in 1931.
5. Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800–1850* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3. For an earlier study on how local society responds to the imposition of

- nationalist projects from above and how identity choices function in a frontier zone, see Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991).
6. See Nelson Manrique, *Campesinado y nación, las guerrillas indígenas en la Guerra con Chile* (Lima: C.I.C.-Ital Perú, S.A., 1981), and Florencia Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
 7. John R. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis, 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
 8. Reséndez, *Changing National Identities*, 7.
 9. Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, eds., *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), 7. Also, for the frontier as a zone of interpenetration, see Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan, eds., *Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edge of the Spanish Empire* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 4. Beyond the more traditional bounds of history and anthropology, border and frontier studies have flourished recently in disciplines such as literary criticism and immigration studies. See Scott Michaelson and David E. Johnson, eds., *Border Theory: The Limits of Cultural Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), and Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, eds., *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
 10. From the Peruvian perspective, some of the more polemical works would include Victor Andrés Belaunde, *Nuestra cuestión con Chile* (Lima: Sanmartí, 1919); Salvador Cornejo Cuadros, *El irredentismo peruano y la solidaridad americana* (Arequipa: Tipografía S. Quiroz, 1919); Víctor M. Maúrtua, *La cuestión del Pacífico* (Lima: Imprenta de E. Moreno, 1901); and Carlos Paz Soldán, *El Perú y Chile: La cuestión de Tacna y Arica* (Lima: Imprenta Liberal, 1901). Contemporary Chilean accounts include Anselmo Blanlot Holley, *Tacna y Arica después del tratado de Ancón* (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1917); Rafael Egaña, *La cuestión de Tacna i Arica* (Santiago: Imprenta Barcelona, 1900); Luis Orrego Luco, *Los problemas internacionales de Chile* (Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes, 1901); Julio Pérez Canto, *El conflicto después de la victoria: Recuerdos e impresiones de un ex-diplomático chileno en el Perú* (Santiago: Editorial Zig-Zag, 1918); and Joaquín Walker Martínez, *Clamores de intervención diplomática* (Santiago: Imprenta Chile, 1919) and *Una revancha con sangre ajena* (Santiago: Imprenta Chile, 1919). More recently, from the Peruvian side, several works have once again taken

- up the Tacna-Arica controversy, though they still approach the problem primarily from the angle of diplomacy and international negotiation and still feature a noticeable Peruvian bias, some much more than others. See Alfonso Benavides Correa, *Una difícil vecindad: Los irrenunciables derechos del Perú en Arica y los recusables acuerdos Peruano-Chilenos de 1985* (Lima: Editorial de la Universidad de San Marcos, 1988) and also his *Perú y Chile* (Lima: Metrocolor S.A., 1993); Carolina Leciñana Falcón, *La Guerra del Pacífico 120 años después* (Lima: Tarea Asociación Gráfica Educativa, 2004); Gustavo Pons Muzzo, *Del Tratado de Ancón a la Convención de Lima: Una historia de la política chilena desde la firma del Tratado de Ancón a la actualidad* (Tacna: Universidad Nacional Jorge Basadre Grohman, 1999); and Ernesto Yepes, *Un plebiscito imposible: Tacna-Arica, 1925–1926* (Lima: Editorial Escuela Nueva, 1999). There is less recent work on the controversy from Chile, though Gonzalo Vial Correa's recent multi-volume *Historia de Chile, 1891–1973* (Santiago: Editorial Santillana del Pacífico, 1986) devotes several sections to the unfolding controversy.
11. William Jefferson Dennis, *Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute* (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1927) and also, *Tacna and Arica: An Account of the Chile-Peru Boundary Dispute and the Arbitrations of the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931); Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites Since the World War*, 2 vols. (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933), 1:331–410 and 2:281–490; Joe F. Wilson, *The United States, Chile and Peru in the Tacna and Arica Plebiscite* (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1979).
 12. Raúl Palacios Rodríguez, *La chilenización de Tacna y Arica, 1883–1929* (Lima: Editorial Arica, 1974). In the early 1970s, the nationalistic rhetoric of the Peruvian military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975) led to heightened tension with the Chilean military government under General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1989) over an arms build-up on the Peruvian-Chilean frontier and the nationalist passions that still smoldered over Tacna and Arica. Palacios Rodríguez, though, does not view the problem from the perspective of nationalism and national identity formation.
 13. Sahlins, *Boundaries*, 22.
 14. Documents discovered in the Archivo de Límites y Fronteras (hereafter ALF) in Lima, and the Archivo Nacional de Chile (hereafter ANCh) in Santiago, figure prominently in this study. In the latter, there is a collection of nineteen volumes of diverse documents pertaining to the Tacna-Arica controversy. I first found these (in 1996) in a general catalog under the category Fondos Administrativos Republicanos. For anyone now attempting to view these volumes, they are kept in *la bóveda* (the vault) of the archive. I have always needed special permission from the archive's director to work with them.

15. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny explain the synthesis of the cultural and political dimensions of nationalism as follows: “Thus, if politics is the ground upon which the category of the nation was first proposed, culture was the terrain where it was elaborated, and in this sense nationality is best conceived as a complex, uneven, and unpredictable process, forged from an interaction of cultural coalescence and specific political intervention, which cannot be reduced to static criteria of language, territory, ethnicity, or culture.” See Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*, 8. Florencia Mallon understands nationalism as both a “broad vision for organizing society” and as a “project for collective identity”; this understanding, once again, recognizes both the political and cultural dimensions of nationalism. See Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*, 1–21.
16. Edward Spicer referred to these buried, alternative national projects as “hidden nations” in “The Nations of a State,” *Boundary 2* 19, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 26–48. For an analysis of the nation-state and its employment of force, see Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1985).
17. Anderson explains that the new Spanish American nations constituted former imperial administrative divisions. Creoles resented their second-class status within the Empire, especially their exclusion from positions of political importance in both America and Spain. In each particular administrative unit—the Captaincies General of Chile and Venezuela, the Audiencia of Charcas, to name but a few examples—this resentment of metropolitan policy contributed to a growing “consciousness of connectedness” among creoles, a shared experience of exclusion felt by all in their position. Anderson gives credit to the rise of print capitalism (the first American newspapers, broadsheets, etc.) for the critical widening of this nascent consciousness of connectedness. In the early nineteenth century, these shared experiences and sentiments evolved into national consciousness in the various regions of Spanish America. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 47–65.
18. For this critique of Benedict Anderson’s theories as applied to the Latin American context, see Sara Castro-Klarén and John Charles Chasteen, eds., *Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).
19. Claudio Lomnitz, “Nationalism as a Practical System: Benedict Anderson’s Theory of Nationalism from the Vantage Point of Spanish America,” in *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America*, ed. Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves, 329–59 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

20. For a theoretical understanding of hegemony, consult Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). See especially the section “Notes on Italian History.” For another understanding of hegemony as a process, see Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 112. For a concise statement on the utility of the concept in understanding political struggles from below in Latin America, see William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” in *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico*, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, 355–66 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), and Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*, 1–21. Both Roseberry and Mallon distinguish between hegemony as a process and hegemony as an outcome; it is in the former sense, I believe, that the concept is most useful for the study of nationalism.
21. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). Also, see Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-Determination,” *International Sociology* 8, no. 4 (1993): 385–411. For a collection of essays on the Habermasian public sphere, see Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). Habermas published his original work in German in 1962.
22. Jürgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964),” *New German Critique* 3 (1974): 49–55. This essay by Habermas offers a concise explanation of the evolution of his concept of the public sphere.
23. For the importance of public discourse for the development of national consciousness, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), particularly 86–106. For a useful volume of essays that deals with this issue in the context of Latin America, see Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, eds., *Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres: Latin American Paths* (Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 1998).
24. Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves, “Introduction,” in Centeno and López-Alves, *The Other Mirror*, 3–23.
25. Steve J. Stern, “Between Tragedy and Promise: The Politics of Writing Latin American History in the Late Twentieth Century,” in *Reclaiming the Political in Latin American History: Essays from the North*, ed. Gilbert Joseph, 41 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).
26. Ernest Renan, “Qu’ est-ce qu’une nation?” trans. Martin Thom, in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha, 8–22 (London: Routledge, 1990).

27. As pointed out by Carlos A. Forment, these are the types of voluntary associations that proliferated during this period in Latin American history and helped establish a solid basis for civic democracy in the region. See Carlos A. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America, 1760–1900: Civic Selfhood and Public Life in Mexico and Peru* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
28. The concept of the “invisible fatherland” appears in Jorge Basadre, *Infancia en Tacna* (Lima: P. L. Villanueva, 1959), 91, and also his *La multitud, la ciudad, y el campo en la historia del Perú*, 3rd ed. (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1980), 243.
29. See Maritza Villavicencio, *Del silencio a la palabra: Mujeres peruanas en los siglos XIX–XX* (Lima: Ediciones Flora Tristán, 1992). Also, Francesca Denegri, *El abanico y la cigarrera: La primera generación de mujeres ilustradas en el Perú* (Lima: Flora Tristán Centro de la Mujer Peruana: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1996).
30. Anne McClintock, “No Longer in a Future Heaven: Nationalism, Gender, and Race,” in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives*, ed. McClintock et al., 89 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). Also, for the gendered dimensions of nationalism, see Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, *Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity, and Politics in Latin America* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), particularly 134–59. Also, see Sylvia Walby, “Woman and Nation,” in *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed. Anthony D. Smith, 81–100 (New York: E. J. Brill, 1992).
31. Sarah C. Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, Peru 1780–1854* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 199.
32. Sarah C. Chambers, “Letters and Salons: Women Reading and Writing the Nation,” in Castro-Klarén and Chasteen, ed., *Beyond Imagined Communities*, 56. Also see Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1053–75; and for an excellent edited volume on the interaction of gender and the nation-state, see Elizabeth Dore and Maxine Molyneux, eds., *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).
33. A president of La Sociedad de Artesanos wrote its history. See Manuel Ticona Medina, *Benemérita Sociedad de Artesanos y Auxilios Mutuos “El Porvenir” Tacna, 1873–1980* (Tacna: Universidad Nacional Jorge Basadre Grohman, 1999).
34. There is a broad literature on the role played by peasants and indigenous populations in postcolonial nation-state making in Latin America,

generally, and Peru more specifically. See Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*; Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); and Charles F. Walker, *Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780–1840* (London and Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). For a recent synthesis of the role of peasants in nation making throughout the Andes, see Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810–1910* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For a provocative study that marshals historical and anthropological research to explain the evolution of discourse pertaining to the racial identity labels “Indian” and “mestizo,” see Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919–1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

Notes to Chapter One

1. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 47–65.
2. For the creation of the Audiencia of Charcas see J. Valerie Fifer, *Bolivia: Land, Location, and Politics Since 1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 6–19, and Herbert S. Klein, *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 40–44. John Lynch explores the de facto power and autonomy of the Audiencia of Charcas in *Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810: The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata* (New York: Greenwood Publishers, 1958), 237–61. For various analyses of the birth of a unique collective identity in Alto Perú see J. M. Barnadas, *Es muy sencillo, llámenle Charcas* (La Paz: Editorial Juventud, 1989); Humberto Vásquez Machicado, *Orígenes históricos de la nacionalidad boliviana* (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, 1975); and Jorge Siles Salinas, *La independencia de Bolivia* (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992), 11–23.
3. For the creation of the intendancies of the captaincy-general of Chile see Diego Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral de Chile*, 16 vols. (Santiago: Rafael Tovar, 1884–1902), 7:5–6. In 1789 Don Ambrosio O’Higgins, father of the liberator of Chile Bernardo O’Higgins, held the titles governor, president (of the audiencia) and captain general of Chile; later, he would become viceroy of Peru. Barros Arana, *Historia*, 5:457–61.
4. For the evolution of the territorial limits of Peru, the classic treatment remains Raúl Porras Barrenechea, *Historia de los límites del Perú*, 2nd ed. (Lima: Casa Editorial E. Rosay, 1930).
5. John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1986). For the wars of independence in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, see chapters 4, 5, and 8, respectively.

About "A Line in the Sand". The final track from The Hunting Party by Linkin Park features guitar work very identical to Victimized. Mike Shinoda has stated that this song is among his favorites on the album as it encapsulates the essence of Linkin Park in one song. "A Line in the Sand" Track Info. Written By Chester Bennington, Joe Hahn, Dave Farrell & 3 more. Release Date June 13, 2014. A line in the sand is a idiom with two similar meanings: The first meaning is of a point (physical, decisional, etc.) beyond which one will proceed no further. An example would be a person who might agree to visit a bar with his friends, but will go no further (i.e. not partake in drinking alcohol). The second meaning is that of a point beyond which, once the decision to go beyond it is made, the decision and its resulting consequences are permanently decided and irreversible. An example would be to Lines in the Sand is a 3rd season episode of House which first aired on September 26, 2006. House is drawn to the case of an autistic boy, apparently only for the reason that the patient can't communicate well enough to give House any clues as to his condition. However, it's House's social skills that are soon at issue when he insists his blood-stained carpet be returned to his office. Meanwhile, a 17 year-old patient starts finding House irresistible.