

Solomon Feferman Publications

1. *Formal Consistency Proofs and Interpretability of Theories*. PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, July 1957.
2. Degrees of unsolvability associated with classes of formalized theories, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 22, pp. 161-175, 1957.
3. (with R. L. Vaught), The first order properties of products of algebraic systems, *Fund. Math.*, vol. 47, pp. 57-103, 1959.
4. (with A. Ehrenfeucht), Representability of recursively enumerable sets in formal theories, *Arch. Math. Logik Grundlagenforsch.*, vol. 5, pp. 37-41, 1959.
5. Arithmetization of metamathematics in a general setting, *Fund. Math.*, vol. 49, pp. 35-92, 1960.
6. (with G. Kreisel and S. Orey), 1-consistency and faithful interpretations, *Arch. Math. Logik Grundlagenforsch.*, vol. 5, pp. 52-63, 1960.
7. Classifications of recursive functions by means of hierarchies, *Trans. Amer. Math. Soc.*, vol. 104, pp. 101-122, 1962.
8. Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 27, pp. 259-316, 1962.
9. (with C. Spector), Incompleteness along paths in progressions of theories, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 27, pp. 383-390, 1962.
10. Systems of predicative analysis, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 29, pp. 1-30, 1964.
11. Some applications of the notions of forcing and generic sets (Summary), in *The Theory of Models*, (Proc. 1963 Internat. Sympos., Berkeley), pp. 89-95, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1965.
12. Some applications of the notions of forcing and generic sets, *Fund. Math.*, vol. 56, pp. 325-345, 1965.
13. *The Number Systems. Foundations of Algebra and Analysis*. Addison-Wesley, Reading, xii + 418 pp., 1964.
14. (with G. Kreisel), Persistent and invariant formulas relative to theories of higher order, (Research Announcement) *Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.*, vol. 72, pp. 480-485, 1966.
15. Predicative provability in set theory, (Research Announcement) *Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.*, vol. 72, pp. 486-489, 1966.
16. Systems of predicative analysis, II. Representations of ordinals, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 33, pp. 193-220, 1968.
17. Autonomous transfinite progressions and the extent of predicative mathematics, in *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science III*, (Proc. 3rd Internat. Congr., Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 121-135, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1968.

18. Persistent and invariant formulas for outer extensions, *Compositio Math.*, vol. 20, pp. 29-52, 1968.
19. Lectures on proof theory, in *Proceedings of the Summer School in Logic*, (Leeds, 1967), Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 70, pp. 1-107, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1968.
20. Hereditarily replete functionals over the ordinals, in *Intuitionism and Proof Theory*, (Proc. Conf., Buffalo, 1968), pp. 289-301, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1970.
21. Formal theories for transfinite iterations of generalized inductive definitions and some subsystems of analysis, in *Intuitionism and Proof Theory*, (Proc. Conf., Buffalo, 1968), pp. 303-326, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1970.
22. Set-theoretical foundations of category theory, in *Reports of the Midwest Category Seminar, III*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 106, pp. 201-247, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1969.
(with an Appendix by G. Kreisel).
23. Predicatively reducible systems of set theory, in *Axiomatic Set Theory*, Proc. Sympos. in Pure Math. vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 11-32, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, 1974.
24. Ordinals and functionals in proof theory, in *Actes du Congrès International des Mathématiciens (Nice) 1970*, vol. 1, pp. 229-233, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1971.
25. Infinitary properties, local functors, and systems of ordinal functions, in *Conference in Mathematical Logic - London '70*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 255, pp. 63-97, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1972.
26. Applications of many-sorted interpolation theorems, in *Proceedings of the Tarski Symposium*, Proc. Sympos. in Pure Math., vol. XXV, pp. 205-223, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, 1974.
27. Intuitionism (part of an article on "Mathematics, foundations of"), in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 15th ed. pp. 633-635 and p. 639, 1974.
28. Two notes on abstract model theory. I. Properties invariant on the range of definable relations between structures, *Fund. Math.*, vol. 82, pp. 153-165, 1974.
29. Two notes on abstract model theory. II. Languages for which the set of valid sentences is semi-invariantly implicitly definable, *Fund. Math.*, vol. 89, pp. 111-130, 1975.
30. Recursion in total functionals of finite type, *Compositio Math.*, vol. 35, pp. 3-22, 1977.
31. A language and axioms for explicit mathematics, in *Algebra and Logic*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 450, pp. 87-139, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1975.
32. A more perspicuous formal system for predicativity, in *Konstruktionen versus Positionen, I*, pp. 68-93, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1979.
33. Impredicativity of the existence of the largest divisible subgroup of an Abelian p-group, in *Model Theory and Algebra. A Memorial Tribute to A.*

- Robinson*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 498, pp. 117-130, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1975.
34. Non-extensional type-free theories of partial operations and classifications, I, in *Proof Theory Symposium, Kiel, 1974*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 500, pp. 73-118, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1975.
 35. Generating schemes for partial recursively continuous functionals (summary), in *Colloque International de Logique*, (Clermont-Ferrand, 1975), pp. 191-198, Éditions du C.N.R.S., Paris, 1977.
 36. Theories of finite type related to mathematical practice, in *Handbook of Mathematical Logic*, pp. 913-971, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977.
 37. Categorical foundations and foundations of category theory, in *Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory*, (Proc. 5th Internat. Cong. Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, London, Ont., 1975), vol. 1, pp. 149-169, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977.
 38. Generalizing set-theoretical model theory and an analogue theory on admissible sets, in *Essays on Mathematical and Philosophical Logic*, Synthese Library, vol. 22, pp. 171-195, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979.
 39. Review of *Proof Theory* by G. Takeuti, *Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.*, vol. 83, pp. 351-361, 1977.
 40. Inductive schemata and recursively continuous functionals, in *Logic Colloquium '76* (Proc. Oxford Conference), pp. 373-392, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977.
 41. Recursion theory and set theory: a marriage of convenience, in *Generalized Recursion Theory II*, pp. 55-98, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1978.
 42. Review of *Proof Theory* by K. Schütte, *Bull. (New Series) Amer. Math. Soc.*, vol. 1, pp. 224-228, 1979.
 43. What does logic have to tell us about mathematical proofs?, *The Mathematical Intelligencer*, vol. 2, pp. 20-24, 1979.
 44. Constructive theories of functions and classes, in *Logic Colloquium '78*, (Proc. Mons Colloq.), pp. 159-224, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979.
 45. The logic of mathematical discovery vs. the logical structure of mathematics, in *PSA 1978*, pp. 309-327, Philosophy of Science Assoc., East Lansing, 1978.
 46. (with P. Aczel), Consistency of the unrestricted abstraction principle using an intensional equivalence operator, in *To H. B. Curry: Essays on Combinatory Logic, Lambda Calculus and Formalism*, pp. 67-98, Academic Press, New York, 1980.
 47. Progressões transfinitas recursivas de teorias axiomáticas (translation of "Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories"), in *O Teorema de Gödel e a Hipótese do Contínuo*, pp. 573-754, Fundação C. Gulbenkian, Lisbon, 1979.

48. As progressões tranfinitas autónomas e a extensão da matemática predicativa (translation of "Autonomous transfinite progressions and the extent of predicative mathematics"), in *O Teorema de Gödel e a Hipótese do Contínuo*, pp. 755-790, Fundação C. Gulbenkian, Lisbon, 1979.
49. Sistemas de análise predicativa (translation of "Systems of predicative analysis"), in *O Teorema de Gödel e a Hipótese do Contínuo*, pp. 790-866, Fundação C. Gulbenkian, Lisbon, 1979.
50. (with W. Buchholz, W. Pohlers, and W. Sieg), *Iterated Inductive Definitions and Subsystems of Analysis: Recent Proof-theoretical Studies*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 897, 388 pps. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1981.
51. How we got from there to here, in *Iterated Inductive Definitions and Subsystems of Analysis: Recent Proof-theoretical Studies*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 897, pp. 1-15, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1981. (Preface).
52. (with W. Sieg), Iterated inductive definitions and subsystems of analysis, in *Iterated Inductive Definitions and Subsystems of Analysis: Recent Proof-theoretical Studies*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 897, pp. 16-77, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1981.
53. (with W. Sieg), Proof-theoretic equivalences between classical and constructive theories for analysis, in *Iterated Inductive Definitions and Subsystems of Analysis: Recent Proof-theoretical Studies*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 897, pp. 78-142, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1981.
54. Iterated inductive fixed-point theories: application to Hancock's conjecture, in *Patras Logic Symposium*, pp. 171-196, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1982.
55. Inductively presented systems and the formalization of meta-mathematics, in *Logic Colloquium '80*, pp. 95-128, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1982.
56. A theory of variable types, *Revista Colombiana de Matemáticas*, (Proc. Latin Amer. Logic Symp., Bogotá 1981), vol. 19, pp. 95-105, 1985.
57. Monotone inductive definitions, in *The L. E. J. Brouwer Centenary Symposium*, pp. 77-89, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1982.
58. (with G. Jäger), Choice principles, the bar rule and autonomously iterated comprehension schemes in analysis, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 48, pp. 63-70, 1983.
59. Toward useful type-free theories, I, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 49, pp. 75-111, 1984.
60. Working foundations, *Synthese*, vol. 62, pp. 229-254, 1985.
61. Foundational ways, in *Perspectives in Mathematics*, pp. 147-158, Birkhäuser, Basel, 1984.
62. Kurt Gödel: conviction and caution, *Philosophia Naturalis*, vol. 21, pp. 546-562, 1984.

63. Between constructive and classical mathematics, in *Computation and Proof Theory*, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 1104, pp. 143-162, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1984.
64. Intensionality in mathematics, *J. Philosophical Logic*, vol. 14, pp. 41-55, 1985.
65. (with J. Barwise, eds.), *Model-theoretic Logics*, xviii + 893 pp. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985.
66. (with J.W. Dawson, Jr., S. C. Kleene, G. H. Moore, R. M. Solovay, and J. van Heijenoort, eds.), *Kurt Gödel. Collected Works, Vol. I. Publications 1929-1936*. Oxford Univ. Press, New York, xvi + 474 pp., 1986.
67. Gödel's life and work, in *Kurt Gödel. Collected Works, Vol. I. Publications 1929-1936*, pp. 1-36, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1986.
68. Proof theory: a personal report, Appendix to *Proof Theory*, 2nd edn., by G. Takeuti, pp. 447-485, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1987.
69. Infinity in mathematics: is Cantor necessary?, in *L'infinito nella scienza (Infinity in Science)*, pp. 151-209, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Rome, 1987.
70. Hilbert's program relativized: proof-theoretical and foundational reductions, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 53, pp. 364-384, 1988.
71. Turing in the land of $0(z)$, in *The Universal Turing Machine. A Half-century Survey*, pp. 113-147, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1988.
72. Weyl vindicated: *Das Kontinuum* 70 years later, in *Temi e prospettive della logica e della filosofia della scienza contemporanee, vol. I*, pp. 59-93, CLUEB, Bologna, 1988.
73. Polymorphic typed lambda-calculi in a type-free axiomatic framework, in *Logic and Computation*, Contemporary Mathematics, vol. 106, pp. 101-136, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, 1990.
74. Finitary inductively presented logics, in *Logic Colloquium '88*, pp. 191-220, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1989; reprinted in *What is a Logical System?* (D. S. Gabbay, ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford (1994), 297-328.
75. Kurt Gödel: conviction and caution, reprinting in *Gödel's Theorem in Focus*, pp. 96-114, Croom Helm, London, 1988.
76. *The Number Systems. Foundations of Algebra and Analysis*, 2nd ed. Chelsea Pub. Co., New York, xii + 418 pp., 2nd ed., 1989.
77. (with J.W. Dawson, Jr., S. C. Kleene, G. H. Moore, R. M. Solovay, and J. van Heijenoort, eds.), *Kurt Gödel. Collected Works, Vol. II, Publications 1938-1974*. Oxford Univ. Press, New York, xv + 407 pp., 1990.
78. Reflecting on incompleteness, *J. Symbolic Logic*, vol. 56, pp. 1-49, 1991.
79. Logics for termination and correctness of functional programs, in *Logic from Computer Science*, pp. 95-127, MSRI Pubs. vol. 21, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1992.

80. Logics for termination and correctness of functional programs, II. Logics of strength PRA, in *Proof Theory* (Leeds Proof Theory Programme 1990), pp. 197-225, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
81. Turing's 'Oracle': From absolute to relative computability - and back, in *The Space of Mathematics*, pp. 314-348, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1992.
82. Proofs of termination and the '91' function, in *Artificial Intelligence and Mathematical Theory of Computation. Papers in honor of John McCarthy*, pp. 47-63, Academic Press, Boston, 1991.
83. Working foundations - '91, in *Bridging the Gap: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics*, Boston Studies in the Philos. of Science vol. 140, pp. 99-124, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993.
84. A new approach to abstract data types, I. Informal development, *Mathematical Structures in Computer Science*, vol. 2, pp. 193-229, 1992.
85. A new approach to abstract data types, II. Computability on ADTs as ordinary computation, in *Computer Science Logic*, Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 626, pp. 79-95, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992.
86. Jean van Heijenoort's scholarly work, Appendix to *Politics, Logic and Love. The Life of Jean van Heijenoort*, by A.B. Feferman, pp. 371-390, A. K. Peters Ltd., Wellesley, 1993.
87. The development of programs for the foundations of mathematics in the first third of the 20th century.
To appear in *Storia del XX secolo: Logica*, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Rome.
88. Julia Bowman Robinson, December 8, 1919 - July 30, 1985.
Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 63, 453-478, 1994.
89. What rests on what? The proof-theoretic analysis of mathematics,
in *Philosophy of Mathematics*, Part I, pp. 147-171, Proceedings of the 15th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1993.
90. Why a little bit goes a long way: Logical foundations of scientifically applicable mathematics, in *PSA 1992*, Vol. II, 442-455, 1993.
91. (with G. Hellman), Predicative foundations of arithmetic. *J. Philosophical Logic* 24, 1-17, 1995.
92. (with G. Jäger), Systems of explicit mathematics with non-constructive μ -operator. Part I.
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 65, 243-263, 1993.
93. Gödel's *Dialectica* interpretation and its two-way stretch, in *Computational Logic and Proof Theory*, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 713, 23-40, 1993.

94. (with J.W. Dawson, Jr., W. Goldfarb, C. Parsons, and R.M. Solovay, eds.), *Kurt Gödel. Collected Works, Vol. III, Unpublished essays and lectures.* Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.
95. (with G. Jäger), Systems of explicit mathematics with non-constructive μ -operator. Part II, *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* 79, 37-52, 1996.
96. Ordinal logics, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 550-551, 1995.
97. Reflection principles, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 682, 1995.
98. Ordinal logics (entry in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*).
99. Kreisel's "unwinding" program, in *Kreiseliana*. A.K. Peters Ltd. 1996, 247-273.
100. Deciding the undecidable: Wrestling with Hilbert's Problems. (Inaugural address, Stanford, May 13, 1994; Ch.1 in item 109).
101. Penrose's Gödelian argument, *PSYCHE* 2 (1996), 21-32.
102. Definedness, *Erkenntnis* 43, 295-320, 1995.
103. Computation on abstract data types. The extensional approach, with an application to streams, *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic*, 81 (1996) 75-113.
104. Proof theory, to appear in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement*, MacMillan Pub. Co.
105. Gödel's program for new axioms: Why, where, how and what?, in *Gödel '96, Lecture Notes in Logic* 6 (1996), 3-22.
106. (Editor) *The Collected Works of Julia Robinson*, American Mathematical Society (1996).
107. (with G. Hellman) Challenges to predicative foundations of arithmetic. in G. Sher and R. Tieszen, eds., *Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons*, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1999) 317-339
108. (with T. Strahm) The unfolding of non-finitist arithmetic. *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* 104 (2000), 75-96.
109. *In the Light of Logic*. Oxford University Press, 1998, xii + 340 pp.
110. Does mathematics need new axioms?, *Amer. Math. Monthly* 106 (1999), 99-111.
111. My route to arithmetization. *Theoria* 63(1997), 168-181.
112. (with J. Avigad) Gödel's functional ("Dialectica") interpretation, in *The Handbook of Proof Theory* (S. Buss, ed.), North-Holland Pub. Co. (1998) 337-405.
113. Three conceptual problems that bug me. (Lecture text for 7th Scandinavian Logic Symposium, 1996).
114. Tarski and Gödel between the lines, in *Tarski and the Vienna Circle* (J. Wolenski and E. Köhler, eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers (1998), 53-63.
115. Highlights in proof theory, in *Proof Theory* (V.F. Hendricks et al., eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000), 11-31.

116. The significance of Hermann Weyl's *Das Kontinuum*, *ibid.*, 179-194.
117. Relationships between constructive, predicative and classical systems of analysis, *ibid.*, 221-236.
118. Mathematical intuition vs. mathematical monsters. *Synthese* 125 (2000), 317-332.
119. Ah, Chu. In *JFAK. Essays Dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the Occasion of his Fiftieth Birthday*, Amsterdam Univ. Press (1999), CD-ROM only.
120. Logic, logics, and logicism. *Notre Dame J. of Formal Logic* 40 (1999), 31-54.
121. Does reductive proof theory have a viable rationale? *Erkenntnis* 53 (2000), 63-96.
122. Alfred Tarski and a watershed conference in logic: Cornell 1957, in (J. Hintikka, et al., eds.) *Philosophy and Logic. In search of the Polish tradition*, Synthese Library vol. 323, Kluwer Acad. Pubs. (2003), 151-162.
123. Does mathematics need new axioms? (Proceedings of a symposium), with Harvey M. Friedman, Penelope Maddy, and John. R. Steel. *Bull. of Symbolic Logic* 6 (2000) 401-446.
124. Why the programs for new axioms need to be questioned. (In preceding item.) *Bull. Symbolic Logic* 6, 401-413.
125. In memoriam: Kenneth Jon Barwise, 1942-2000. *Bull. Symbolic Logic* 6 (2000) 505-508.
126. Tarski's conception of logic. *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* 126 (2004) 5-13.
127. Tarski's conceptual analysis of semantical notions, *Sémantique et épistémologie* (A. Benmakhlouf, ed.) Editions Le Fennec, Casablanca (2004) [distrib. J. Vrin, Paris) 79-108. Reprinted in (D. Patterson, ed.) *New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy*, Oxford Univ. Press (2008), 72-93.
128. Predicativity. *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic* (S. Shapiro ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005) 590-624.
129. *Kurt Gödel. Collected Works. Vol. IV. Correspondence A-G* (as editor-in-chief, with J. W. Dawson, Jr., Warren Goldfarb, Charles Parsons and Wilfried Sieg, co-editors). Oxford University Press (Oxford), 2003.
130. *Kurt Gödel. Collected Works. Vol. V. Correspondence H-Z* (as editor-in-chief, with J. W. Dawson, Jr., Warren Goldfarb, Charles Parsons and Wilfried Sieg, co-editors). Oxford University Press (Oxford), 2003.
131. Typical ambiguity: trying to have your cake and eat it too, *One Hundred Years of Russell's Paradox* (G. Link, ed.), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin (2004) 131-151.

132. What kind of logic is "Independence Friendly" logic?, in *The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka* (Randall E. Auxier and Lewis E. Hahn, eds.), Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court (2006), 453-469.
133. Comments on "Predicativity as a philosophical position" by G. Hellman, *Review Internationale de Philosophie* (special issue, Russell en héritage. Le centenaire des *Principles*, Ph. de Rouilhan, ed.) 229 (no. 3, 2004), 313-323.
134. The Gödel editorial project: A synopsis, *Bull. Symbolic Logic* 11 (2005) 132-149.
135. Enriched stratified systems for the foundations of category theory, in *What is Category Theory?* (G. Sica, ed.) Polimetria, Milano (2006), 185-203; reprinted in (G. Sommaruga, ed.), *Foundational Theories of Classical and Constructive Mathematics*, Springer, Dordrecht (2011), 127-143.
136. Are there absolutely unsolvable problems? Gödel's dichotomy, *Philosophia Mathematica* (2006) 14(2): 134-152.
137. Review of *Incompleteness. The proof and paradox of Kurt Gödel*, by Rebecca Goldstein, *London Review of Books* vol. 28 no. 3 (9 Feb. 2006).
138. The impact of the incompleteness theorems on mathematics, *Notices of the American Mathematical Society* 53, no.4 (April 2006), 434-439.
139. Turing's thesis, *Notices American Mathematical Society*, 53 no. 10 (Nov. 2006), 1200-1205.
140. Lieber Herr Bernays! Lieber Herr Gödel! Gödel on finitism, constructivity and Hilbert's program, *Dialectica* 62 (2008), 179-203. (This is a preprint of the following; the differences are of an editorial nature.)
141. Lieber Herr Bernays! Lieber Herr Gödel! Gödel on finitism, constructivity and Hilbert's program, in (M. Baaz, et al., eds.) *Kurt Gödel and the Foundations of Mathematics. Horizons of Truth*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge (2011), 111-133.
142. Harmonious logic: Craig's interpolation theorem and its descendants, *Synthese* 164, no. 3 (2008), 341-357.
143. Axioms for determinateness and truth, *The Review of Symbolic Logic* 1, no. 2 (2008), 204-217.
144. Philosophy of Mathematics: 5 questions, in (V. F. Hendricks and H. Leitgeb, eds.) *Philosophy of Mathematics: 5 Questions*, Automatic Press/VIP (2008) 115-135.
145. Gödel, Nagel, minds and machines, *J. of Philosophy* CVI no. 4 (2009), 201-219. (Ernest Nagel Lecture, Columbia University, Sept. 27, 2007).
146. Operational set theory and small large cardinals, *Information and Computation* 207 (2009), 971-979.
147. Modernism in mathematics, review of *Plato's Ghost* by Jeremy Gray, *American Scientist* 97 no. 5 (2009), 417.

148. Conceptions of the continuum, *Intellectica* 51 (2009), 169-189.
149. The unfolding of finitist arithmetic (with Thomas Strahm), *The Review of Symbolic Logic* 3 (2010), 665-689.
150. Set-theoretical invariance criteria for logicality, *Notre Dame J. of Formal Logic* 51 (2010), 3-20.
151. Gödel's incompleteness theorems, free will and mathematical thought, in (R. Swinburne, ed.) *Free Will and Modern Science*, Oxford Univ. Press for the British Academy, Oxford (2011), 102-122.
152. On the strength of some semi-constructive theories, in (S. Feferman and W. Sieg, eds.) *Proof, Categories and Computation: Essays in Honor of Grigori Mints*, College Publications, London (2010), 109-129; reprinted in (U. Berger, et al., eds.) *Logic, Construction, Computation*, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt (2012), 201-22.
153. The proof theory of classical and constructive inductive definitions. A 40 year saga, 1968-2008, in (R. Schindler, ed.) *Ways of Proof Theory*, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt (2010), 7-30. (Wolfram Pohlers Festschrift volume).
154. Axiomatizing truth: Why and how, in (U. Berger, et al., eds.) *Logic, Construction, Computation*, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt (2012), 185-200. (Helmut Schwichtenberg Festschrift volume.)
155. And so on ... Reasoning with infinite diagrams, *Synthese* 186 (2012), 371-386.
156. Review of Curtis Franks, *The Autonomy of Mathematical Knowledge. Hilbert's program revisited*, in *Philosophia Mathematica. Series III*, 20 no. 3 (2012), 387-400.
157. On rereading van Heijenoort's *Selected Essays*, in *Logica Universalis* 6 no. 3-4 (2012), 535-552.
158. Foundations of unlimited category theory: What remains to be done, *The Review of Symbolic Logic* 6 (2013), 6-15.
159. How a little bit goes a long way: Predicative foundations of analysis, [http://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/pfa\(1\).pdf](http://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/pfa(1).pdf), unpublished notes dating from 1977-1981, with a new introduction.
160. About and around computing over the reals, in (B. J. Copeland, C. J. Posy and O. Shagrir, eds.) *Computability. Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond*, MIT Press (2013), 55-76.
161. Turing's Thesis: Ordinal logics and oracle computability, in *Alan Turing: His Work and Impact* (S. B. Cooper and J. van Leeuwen, eds.) Elsevier, Amsterdam (2013), 145-150.

Solomon Feferman is on the faculty of Stanford University, California, where he is Professor of Mathematics and Philosophy. He is a recipient of the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has held a Guggenheim fellowship twice. He is the author of *In the Light of Logic* and the editor-in-chief of the multi-volume *Kurt Godel: Collected Works*.